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INTRODUCTION
This was a secret war, whose battles were lost or won unknown to the public; and only with difficulty is it comprehended, even now, by those outside the small high scientific circles concerned. No such warfare had ever been waged by mortal men.
Winston Churchill 1 At its inception, during World War II, electronic warfare (EW) was something truly new and novel, earning inclusion in Winston Churchill's memoirs under a chapter titled "The Wizard War."
2 In many ways, the primary functions of EW in the 1940s changed little over the next 60 years; even diminishing somewhat as the information technology (IT) of the US quickly surpassed and then vastly exceeded that of its primary rival, the Soviet Union. 3 While
IT transformed commerce, education, government, and even society itself, military theorists began to ponder the impacts of IT on the military, advocating and gaining support in the Department of Defense (DoD) for the transformational power of the network.
What was not expected, however, were the capabilities that IT would bring to US adversaries, even in an asymmetrical contest. Less than a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the improvised explosive device (IED), often triggered by radio, became the primary threat to US forces, leading to a massive deployment of EW equipment to ground forces. Although the primary strategy was to counter the IEDs, this marked a radical shift in the use of EW on the battlefield, leading to organizational changes in the Army and Marine
Corps and a significant electronic fratricide problem that "polluted" the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) in Iraq.
Although not yet fully recognized throughout DoD, EW has changed from primarily low-density, high demand capability against centralized command and control systems to high-density distributed electronic attack against radio devices that are now available worldwide. The US can no longer fully dominate the EMS. In order to deny portions of the EMS to the enemy, US forces must accept some degree of interference. Frequency managers have achieved a great deal of success in managing the spectrum, but the advent of wideband datalinks, fixed navigation signals, and overlapping frequency bands between friendly and enemy forces will result in some degree of conflict that cannot be resolved.
While technical solutions are in development that will make receivers smarter, this technology will also be available to adversaries, and may take a decade or more to reach the Warfighter. It also does not solve several underlying issues throughout DoD, such as diminishing EW expertise, lack of EW integration in joint planning, and vulnerabilities in US military IT capabilities. Ultimately, operational leadership is required to ensure objectives are met while minimizing electronic fratricide. Rather than planning using the abstract notions of cyberspace or information operations, balancing electronic warfare forces in space and time will provide the best solution to the new challenges in the electromagnetic environment.
WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Naval War is to Navies as Information War is to what? Martin Libicki 4 At its core, the information age is the result of the microelectronics revolution that began with the invention of the transistor at Bell Labs in 1947. 5 Since then, the transistor has spawned new technologies every decade. In the last 50 years of the 20 th Century, the United
States led the world in high technology as it developed the mainframe computer, the integrated circuit, the microprocessor, the personal computer, the Internet, cellular telephony, and satellite communication. 6 Moore's Law has held up remarkably well, 7 leading to exponential growth in computing power available for cars, toasters, and cell phones. third world nations with apparent ease from the air, and mopping up with a short ground war. 11 In the years that followed, in parallel with the massive shift in the business world caused by the emergence of the Internet, some military thinkers began to hail a revolution in military affairs (RMA), driven by IT. The names associated with this new way of war are familiar to any reader of military journals: "information warfare (IW)," "cyberwarfare,"
"netwar," "and "network-centric warfare (NCW 
THE NEW ELECTRONIC WARFARE ERA
While making the most of advanced technology, you have to be careful that modern strategy is not influenced by what I call the Omdurman complex. You will remember that famous last cavalry charge across the desert by the soldiers of the Mahdi in 1898. The Omdurman complex consists of expecting that an army from the Third World will suddenly appear out of the desert in great numbers and charge at you in a mass in order to be mowed down by modern equipment. While the Army had essentially abandoned EW in the 1970s, 37 the USAF also realized that its knowledge and capability had atrophied. 38 The Air Force and the Navy efforts over the past few decades have been focused on the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) mission, as both services worked to replace the aging EA-6B platform.
John Ralston Saul

39
The EA-6B and its communications jamming counterpart, the EC-130 Compass Call, have held special status as low-density, high-demand assets, 40 establishing a long-term paradigm for EW of specialization and limited use. With the focus on the airborne SEAD mission, ground commanders had little experience with EW, and lacked doctrine, tactics, or equipment to employ it. 41 When the first radio-triggered IEDs appeared in Afghanistan in 2002, Army and Marine units had no means to counter the devices, other than a few lowpower systems used by explosive ordnance disposal teams. Fortunately, the Navy had a warehouse full of obsolete jammers originally designed for ship defense. Known as Acorn, over 2000 were eventually deployed to Afghanistan, and were largely effective, 42 although 50% of all combat casualties in Afghanistan have been attributed to IEDs. 43 In Iraq, however, the scale of the threat, as well as the ingenuity of the insurgents, proved to be far more problematic. Over 60% of casualties in Iraq have been caused by IEDs, including 1800 or more combat deaths. 44 The Iraqi insurgents used a variety of techniques to detonate the bombs, including trip wires, timers, radio, and infrared devices. 45 In some regions, 70% of IEDs were radio-triggered; 46 using car key fobs, radio-controlled toys, and other wireless technology. 47 The operational objective for the widespread use of IED jammers was to "put them back on the wire," forcing insurgents to use mechanical triggers that would be simpler to detect. 52 This strategy appeared to be succeeding, reducing radio-controlled bombs to 10% of all IEDs in Iraq, although the overall number of attacks has not diminished. 53 Even so, JIEDDO claims that, with capabilities employed to the field, roughly half of all IEDs are detected and cleared by coalition forces. 54 Although IT has profoundly enhanced American military power, it has also served as a "great equalizer." 55 
MILITARY SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE
One of the greatest challenges of the war has been managing the RF Spectrum.
Gen (ret) John Abizaid 64 The electromagnetic spectrum, normally depicted in charts such as Figure 1 , leaves many with the impression that it is a physical space where signals interact. 65 In reality, the EMS is a conceptual tool used to avoid radio frequency interference between systems and users. 66 However, electromagnetic waves do not interact in space; rather, electronic warfare interference occurs inside radio receiver electronics. 67 In other words, jamming, whether intentional or unintentional, attacks receivers, not signals. Although information operations and cyberspace are useful constructs, another way to look at the type of tactical EW seen in
Iraq is as a physical non-kinetic attack on the enemy's weapon system or command and control network. Frequency List (JFRL), which lists the networks and frequencies deemed critical to JTF objective.
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As IED jammers proliferated in Iraq, "electronic fratricide" 72 became a new issue for frequency managers to tackle. The jammers often prevented the soldiers operating them from using their tactical radios, and impacted other communications and surveillance systems as well. 73 Jamming degraded datalinks on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) such as the Predator. 74 In many cases, soldiers turned off the jammers to keep communication channels open. 75 The problem was made worse by the use of EC-130 and EA-6B aircraft to clear convoy routes, which increased the interference due to wider propagation of jamming signals.
76,77
The Multinational Force -Iraq (MNF-I) was ill-equipped to handle the challenges of electronic fratricide. When the problems began, there was no EWCC, 78 and EW expertise was lacking at the headquarters. 79 EW was excluded from the joint planning process, a situation which was corrected with the establishment of an EWCC in Iraq in late 2005. 80 As CENTCOM and the MNF-I adjusted planning processes, some of the shortcomings of the available tools became apparent, leading the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to create a new organization to seek better technology solutions for spectrum management.
In the Spring of 2006, the DoD's chief information officer combined the Defense Spectrum Office and the Joint Spectrum Center to form the Defense Spectrum Organization (DSO). 81 The long-term strategy for DSO is to develop a new spectrum management tool called the Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System (GEMSIS), while incrementally improving the current joint spectrum management tool, Spectrum XXI. 82 DSO is also looking toward "emerging technologies such as software-defined radio and cognitive radio" to enable dynamic spectrum access.
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ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
"Safe to say, adversaries will figure out ways to blunt the U.S. informational advantage. From Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan to numerous misadventures in Iraq, they already have." Max Boot
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Prior to OIF, electronic fratricide caused by EW was largely manageable. With SEAD as the primary mission, a large percent of electronic attack occurred early in the campaign, often far away from the bulk of coalition forces, and at frequencies known from signals intelligence. The IED threat introduced a new problem: enemy use of unknown frequencies, sometimes overlapping frequencies used by coalition forces, and geographically collocated or intermixed with friendly units. As wireless technology continues to proliferate, other conditions are likely to emerge, including known, fixed frequencies used by both enemy and friendly forces (e.g. GPS), signals that require very large bandwidths (e.g. ultrawideband), deliberate enemy use of friendly frequency bands, and enemy use of civilian communication systems (e.g. cell phones and wireless data networks). Even though technologies such as software-defined radio may help with the problem, the troubles experienced by the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) indicate that technical solutions will be costly and take years to deploy, 85 and similar technology may be available to adversaries as well.
Satellite navigation is a particularly interesting case, because it is a significant force enhancement capability globally, is a dual-use system, and uses wideband signals that are relatively easy to jam. In many ways, the history of GPS blue-force denial is the opposite of the IED story. The immediate need to counter IEDs due to significant casualty rates led to rapid development and employment of EW capability to defeat the threat: 30,000 jammers deployed in less than four years. With GPS, however, presidential and congressional direction to develop a capability to deny hostile use of GPS (beginning in 1996) 86, 87 resulted in almost no operational planning or deployment of GPS denial capability. The primary reason for this is the overlap of GPS civil and military frequencies. An aggressive effort to modernize GPS is underway, which will provide frequency separation, 88 however such an effort will take decades, as modernized receivers replace legacy GPS equipment.
Meanwhile, use of GPS by adversaries has not materialized as a real threat, and the DoD awaits the technical solution.
Frequency management is a necessary task. Even without EW, deconfliction is required to ensure avoidable interference is managed. However, the enemy does not partake of the deconfliction process. As demonstrated in Iraq, an underground insurgency can ingeniously exploit information technology. Even the great powers understand the implications of using the same frequencies as the US to avoid EW or gain some other strategic advantage. The European Union (EU) originally attempted to overlay a signal for their Galileo satellite navigation system directly on the new GPS military frequencies. 89 Although the US and the EU resolved the dispute, China has recently applied the same strategy against both the EU and the US. 90 Regarding IEDs, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England stated that "It's a hard problem. There is no solution, just better ways of dealing with it. You keep mitigating as much as you can, but at the end of the day, it's warfare." 91 While not yet approaching the complexity of the IED threat, a similar sentiment applies to electronic fratricide caused by EW. Although one strategy is to merely avoid EW altogether, this assumes that EW does not provide an essential capability. Such was not the case with IEDs. Although jamming was employed tactically, the net effect was to achieve an operational objective: reduce casualties in the JOA caused by the primary insurgent weapon. The joint operational community can achieve balance between electronic fratricide and operational objectives by taking several key steps. IED suppression, EW has primarily been used for command and control warfare and force protection. As one analyst warned over ten years ago, "information is not likely to be an appropriate integrating principle, either strategically or organizationally… instead, 'information warfare' needs to be broken down into its various components, and those need to be integrated effectively into the full range of military operations." 92 Perhaps the neglect of EW during the 1990s can be attributed to its incorporation into IW and IO, while its resurgence has been driven by the tactical need to counter a physical command link between a bomber and his bomb. Likewise, including EW in a cyberspace construct may be meaningless to the soldier with a jammer mounted on his vehicle. Jamming is a fivedimensional physical phenomenon that can be controlled in frequency, space and time. The current emphasis on frequency management mirrors the civilian world of spectrum management, where interference cannot be tolerated. Rather than seeking to provide a high quality of service such as is expected from commercial service providers, the use of EW, and the negative impact on friendly forces, should be balanced against objectives.
Second, EW needs to be "demystified" at all levels of warfare, just as the Army endeavors to demystify it in their tactical training. 93 EW is widely perceived as a "black art," impenetrable to outsiders due to both security classification and its technical nature. 94 The complexity of the computer models used to determine EW effects and potential electronic fratricide also tend to put EW in the hands of specialists. Third, although JP 3-13.1 states that EW is "centrally planned and directed and decentrally executed," 95 the implications of widely distributed EW need to be carefully analyzed. NCW has tended to lead to "increased centralization on all levels." 96 A tactical commander well-trained in EW and operating under "task-oriented command and control"
should be able to respond more quickly to a situation requiring jamming than waiting for permission from headquarters to jam, or eliminating the option due to higher headquarters direction.
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On the other hand, the operational commander must have sufficient control to balance political and strategic issues associated with spectrum, including impact on civilians, coalition partners, and safety-of-life services. Some have proposed implementing a "frequency tasking order (FTO)" 98 similar to the air tasking order (ATO), but this would result in even greater centralization then exists today. Although airborne EW often affects large areas, lower-power ground-based jammers have more limited range, due to both radiated power and terrain masking. Operational commanders may be able to establish rules of engagement (ROEs) for tactical commanders that define the acceptable operational envelope for EW. With sufficient EW knowledge at both the operational and tactical levels, the detrimental effects can be minimized in both space and time while giving tactical commanders the freedom to utilize EW capability.
Finally, EW needs to be incorporated into joint test, training, and exercises, preparing forces for operating under conditions where communication, navigation, or sensor equipment may be temporarily lost. A short-term loss of GPS could result in a UAV crash, or worse.
Such vulnerability needs to be remedied, since an enemy jammer could create the same effect. The loss of tactical voice communications for 1 hour or longer should be planned for, with soldiers able to accomplish the mission when connectivity is lost. Joint exercises will also illuminate interoperability issues between the Services and among land, sea, and air components.
CONCLUSION
EW has changed, for better or worse. Although the superiority of American IT is unquestionable, the prophets of IW did not foresee the equalizing effect of commercial IT and the subsequent need for electronic countermeasures. The rapid push to deploy EW to Iraq complicated the precarious balance of spectrum use employed by frequency managers in the theater.
Enemy spectrum, is by definition, a jamming target, and should be off-limits for friendly forces, if possible. But increasingly, there is a lack of "clear" spectrum as wideband signals provide an increasingly larger number of digital bits per second. Clever adversaries may exploit US dependence on information networks by deliberately overlapping US spectrum use or utilizing civil spectrum deemed untouchable to US forces.
While some technologies may help in the long-term, the use of the EMS is an operational problem, with operational solutions. Effective planning, preparation, and leadership is the best approach to employing EW in the modern age.
